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Abstract  
 
In this chapter I draw on Foucault’s genealogical method to examine the professional 
turn in school governance through a study of recent and profound changes affecting 
the development of education policy in England since the introduction of the 
Academies Act 2010.  The Academies Act 2010 was a watershed moment in 
education reform that facilitated widespread privatisation, depoliticisation and 
devolved management of the school system.  The consequences of these reforms 
have produced mixed results and gains for different stakeholders and interest 
groups.  Among the main beneficiaries are businesses set up as private limited 
companies who occupy the role of management groups and support services to an 
increasingly dense, specialised and juridified system of governance.  Local 
communities and ordinary citizens, on the other hand, find themselves marginalised 
from the business of governance and its expert administration.  No longer strictly 
participatory in design or practice, the role of school governance has shifted 
dramatically towards a rigid focus on ‘risk-based regulation’ to enhance upward 
accountability to the funders and regulators of education.  This chapter examines two 
key features of these reforms, namely epistocracy and monopoly, and considers the 
challenges they pose to participatory democracy in schools. 
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Introduction 
 
In this chapter I draw on Foucault’s genealogical method to examine some of the 
fundamental changes to school governance in England effected by the introduction 
of the Academies Act 2010 and subsequent legislation and policy (DfE 2010, DfE 
2012, DfE 2013a, DfE 2013b, DfE 2016, DfE 2017a, Education Act 2011, Education 
and Adoption Bill 2015, Ofsted 2011).  Specifically, the chapter addresses the 
diminished role of participatory democracy in many schools given the narrow 
instrumental focus to ‘modernise’ or ‘professionalise’ governance through appointing 
only suitably qualified, skilled and experienced individuals to the governing body.  
This chapter documents the rise of epistocracy (rule by the most knowledgeable) 
and monopoly (rule by hierarchy) as endemic features of the turn to ‘professional 
governance’.   
 
Drawing attention to the role of democracy, the chapter also details the impact of 
professional governance on traditional forms of bureau-professionalism and 
stakeholding, including discretionary powers among civil servants and elected 
councillors and school governors to intervene in the running of schools.  Here, the 
technocratic embedding of professionalism within school governance is closely 
linked to new managerialism and new public management (NPM) with its emphasis 
on ‘output controls…private-sector styles of management practice [and] greater 
discipline and parsimony in resource use’ (Hood 1991: 4-5).  A consequence of these 
reforms, I argue, is the hiving of governance activities and spaces through 
‘enclosures’ that limit participation to those who are bearers of relevant knowledge, 
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skills and expertise.  These enclosures are typically structured through ‘consensus’ 
or ‘oneness’ driven by ‘like-minded people’ with sufficient skills and knowledge to 
discharge their responsibilities in holding others to account for the educational and 
financial performance of the school, notably the headteacher and members of the 
middle management team.  Although these enclosures are representative to some 
degree – they include an elected parent governor in most cases – they are largely 
structured through an indifference to sectional interests and partisanship. 
 
The high-stakes environment in which school governors now find themselves means 
that performance management and ‘risk-based regulation’ (Hutter 2005) underpinned 
by financial monitoring and strategic planning constitute a vital element of 
governance.  Consequently, the scope for dissensus and value conflicts tend to be 
minimised in order to maintain the efficiency of such work.  According to Kooiman 
and Jentoft (2009: 818),  
 
norms, principles and values…They underpin all decisions since they inspire 
those who govern how to think and make judgements about how the world 
works and how to act in particular situations…Implicitly or explicitly, 
governance means choosing between them.  
 
In this chapter I challenge this somewhat idealised view of governance by drawing 
attention to the technocratic cultures of precision and bounded judgement through 
which norms and values of governance are encountered rather than genuinely 
deliberated.  Instead, this chapter demonstrates the extent to which depoliticisation – 
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and therefore the evacuation of the political core constituting value conflicts – is 
considered to be vital to ‘good governance’ and its quality and effectiveness.  
Borrowing from Escobar and Elstub’s (2017) work on ‘mini-publics’, the chapter 
concludes by thinking through some of the possibilities for greater democratic 
innovations and participatory governance in education. 
 
A Foucauldian genealogical method 
 
This chapter draws on Foucault’s genealogical method to trace the ascendency and 
dominance of particular ideas that have shaped the development of school 
governance in England, namely ‘the historical process of descent and emergence by 
which a given thought system or process comes into being and is subsequently 
transformed’ (Olssen 2014: 29).  In the spirit of Foucault’s genealogical method, the 
chapter does not conceptualise governance in strict historical-linear or tautological 
terms as the gradual unfolding of a universal or rational project.  Here, instead, 
governance is conceptualised as a hegemonic movement or ‘complex alliance and 
power bloc’ (Apple 2017: 2) made up of ‘contingent ruptures and displacements that 
arise from struggles among agents’ (Bevir 2010: 421).   
 
A key strategy to employing Foucault’s genealogical method in the context of this 
chapter is to open up that discursive space in which meanings and practices of 
governance are not treated as legitimate to the extent they are identical and 
indivisible to prevailing ideology.  Typically, policy makers, education advisers, 
governance support services, and politicians reduce governance to something 
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programmatic and procedural, namely a set of techniques or strategies to ensure 
that schools are transparent and publicly accountable – properly audited and 
monitored, high achieving, financially sustainable, law compliant, non-discriminatory, 
and so on.  At the same time, governance can be more creatively aligned with 
practices that work to strengthen direct relations of accountability between schools 
and the communities they serve through forms of public deliberation.  Co-operative 
schools (or ‘public service mutuals’) enable pupils, teachers, parents, local people, 
employers, and other member groups (universities and schools) to join their board of 
trustees, for example (Davidge, Facer and Schostak 2015).  Governance, therefore, 
is a ‘field of contestation’ (Wilkins and Olmedo 2018) in which competing, sometimes 
irreconcilable sets of interests and normative commitments emerge through the 
interaction between schools and their various stakeholders.  Through its attention to 
‘nominalism, contingency and contestability’ (Bevir 2010: 426), Foucault’s 
genealogical method is useful here to preserving the notion of governance as a 
continually evolving, mutating project that is amenable to democratic means and 
ends. 
 
The politics of governance 
 
School governance has a long history in England which can be traced back over 600 
years to the Winchester School in 1382 (Sallis 1988).  Up until the late nineteenth 
century schools in England were funded and maintained by either religious 
organisations or town and city corporations who relied on school governors – or 
‘custodians’, ‘wardens’ and ‘stewards’ as they were sometimes called – to oversee 
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the educational and financial performance of their schools.  In response to concerns 
over poor governance, two major government enquiries were commissioned during 
the nineteenth century to investigate the financial and management activities of 
hundreds of grammar, private and proprietary schools.  The Clarendon Commission 
in 1861 and the Taunton Commission in 1864 brought into sharp focus evidence of 
mismanagement and misuse of endowments by some school governors.  These 
enquiries laid the foundation for the Public Schools Act 1868 which introduced 
guidelines and frameworks to help to specify the remit and influence of school 
governors.   
 
Following the introduction of county and county borough councils in 1888, the 1902 
Education Act introduced local education authorities (LEAs) who acquired powers to 
intervene in the running of both elementary non-denominational state schools 
introduced through the Education Act 1870 and some public elementary and 
voluntary schools.  It was common, therefore, for LEA appointees to be present on 
the governing bodies of some grammar schools and church schools in receipt of 
public subsidy.  Following the recommendations of the publication A New Partnership 
for Our Schools (Taylor 1977), the Education Act 1980 and Education Act 1986 
introduced fundamental changes to school governance that included equal 
representation of the LEA, staff and parents on governing bodies as well as 
delegation of powers to school governors to shape decisions about admissions, 
finance and other strategic matters.  As a result, the powers of LEAs to intervene in 
the running of the schools was significantly downsized to make way for greater 
stakeholder governance and devolved management.  Up until this time LEAs were 
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‘managing bodies’ of most primary schools under guidelines laid out in the Education 
Act 1944 and Education (No 2) Act 1968.   
 
Guided by public choice theory and neoclassical economics which strongly opposed 
state intervention in the economy and welfare as authoritarian, demoralising and 
inefficient (Gamble 1986; Niskanen 1973), these reforms ushered in a new era of 
school governance which opposed the bureau-professionalism (or bureaucratic 
centralism) and politicised decision making of LEAs and their discretionary powers to 
nominate members to governing bodies.  Breaking with these trends in school 
governance, the Education Act 1980 and Education Act 1986 not only enabled 
schools to co-opt members to their governing body but confirmed the statutory right 
of parents to be elected as school governors.   
 
The significance of public choice theory to this movement cannot be underestimated 
in terms of understanding the close relationship between the growth of marketisation 
in education and the development of various forms of de-collectivisation, 
depoliticisation and de-democratisation since the 1980s.  Central to public choice 
theory is the view that collective decision making by political organisations, be it 
trade unions or local government, is not only untrustworthy – public servants are just 
as likely to be ‘self-interested’ as they are ‘public spirited altruists’ (Le Grand 1997: 
149) – but inefficient and unresponsive since it works from position of 
epistemological arrogance or naïve presumption regarding the relevant facts about 
the complexity of human or social ‘need’.  Public choice theory, therefore, champions 
market concepts of competition and supply and demand as essential to ‘allocative 
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efficiency’ (Boyne 1996: 704) in terms of improving upon service provider 
responsiveness to user preference or choice.   
 
Similar parallels can be drawn from the US where, as MacLean (2017) observes, 
public choice theory has been used effectively as a political instrument to undermine 
consolidation of bargaining power among certain organisations and collectives to 
influence education, health and other services.  These organisations and the politics 
and bureaucracy underpinning them are typically characterised by public choice 
theorists and like-mind neoconservatives and libertarians as alienating and 
oppressive to the extent they undermine certain freedoms, namely the individual’s 
freedom to pursue their own self-interest.  Hence, public choice theory has been 
integral to the development of competition and choice as organising principles of 
public sector management, especially in England (Le Grand 1997).  Similar to 
England, the development of public choice theory in the US has been instrumental to 
legitimating the market as the only viable programme for organising public and 
private institutional arrangements and transactions (MacLean 2017).  Yet, in 
contradistinction to public choice theory and its staunch opposition to producer 
paternalism, the development of education in both the US and England has given 
rise to new forms of anti-competition arrangements and monopoly (Saltman 2014; 
Wilkins 2017a). 
 
The direction of travel set in motion by the Conservative government in England in 
the 1980s was continued through the 1990s and 2000s with Tony Blair’s Labour 
government (1997-2007) and Brown’s Labour government (2007-2010).  As Clarke 
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(2005: 449) observes, New Labour captured and translated the Conservative view of 
‘the people versus the state, with the people requiring rescue from an over-bearing, 
intrusive and dominating public power’.  Building on the model of stakeholder 
governance envisioned by previous Conservative governments, the Labour 
government placed a strong emphasis on the role of proportional representation on 
governing bodies, namely ‘representation of key stakeholders (parents, staff, 
community, LEA, foundation and sponsors)’, to ensure schools are ‘accountable to 
parents, pupils, staff and the local community’ (DfES 2005a: 7).  However, it was also 
during this time that the Labour government introduced the academies programme to 
enable sponsors (usually a charity, business, faith group, university, or philanthropic 
entrepreneur) to manage underperforming schools in urban areas.  Designed to offer 
‘radical and innovative challenges to tackling educational disadvantage’ (DfES 
2005b: 29), the academies programme made it possible for private sponsors to enter 
into a funding agreement with the Secretary of State and run schools independent of 
LEAs.  
 
Much like the City Technology Colleges (CTCs) introduced under the terms of the 
Education Reform Act 1988 and the Local Management of Schools (LMS), the 
academy model enabled maximum delegation of managerial and financial 
responsibility to a separate legal entity known as an academy trust (a company 
limited by guarantee).  Directed by a board of trustees with legal powers to set the 
curriculum and admissions policy and employ the staff, the academy trust answers to 
central government by way of its funding agreement and therefore is not directly 
accountable to the LEA, other than on matters of special needs and exclusions as is 
required of all publicly-funded schools.  Similar reforms, albeit reforms sensitive to 
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geo-political tensions and specific regulatory regimes and national strategic priorities, 
can be traced to Australia (Gobby 2016), South Africa (Karlsson 2002) and New 
Zealand (Jacobs 2000) where school leaders and school governors are granted 
conditional freedoms to determine budget spending and admissions policy beyond 
the control of any local government or municipal authority.   
 
While reforms designed to ‘liberate’ schools from local government politics and 
bureaucracy in England can be traced back to the 1980 and 1986 Education Acts 
and the 1988 Education Reform Act (ERA) (DES 1998), the scale and pace of these 
reforms were advanced considerably under the Coalition government in 2010.  The 
Labour government opened 203 academies between 1997 and 2010 and therefore 
continued the discursive and political work of disaggregating state power to 
complement new forms of self-organisation or ‘heterarchy’ (Grimaldi 2011: 120) 
characterised by devolved systems of education planning.  In 2010, the election of 
the Coalition government (a cooperation between the Conservative and Liberal 
Democratic party) brought new impetus to these reforms with the introduction of the 
Academies Act 2010.  The Academies Act 2010 made it possible for all ‘good’ and 
‘outstanding’ schools (and, for the first time, primary schools) to apply to the 
Department of Education (DfE) to convert to academy status.  Recent statistics 
released by the DfE (2017b) indicate there are 5,905 academies open representing 
30% of the total number of primary, secondary, special, and alternative provision 
schools in England.  Central to these reforms and others that preceded it (DfES 
2001, DfES 2005a, 2005b) is the displacement of traditional structures of 
government, notably the discretionary powers of civil servants and elected 
councillors to intervene in the running of schools, and the articulation of a new 
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political settlement in which schools are managed by separate legal entities known 
as academy trusts.   
 
These reforms can be described, on the one hand, as new modes of governing in 
which education planning is managed through the interaction, cooperation and co-
influence of multiple stakeholders (Sørensen and Torfing 2007).  On the other hand, 
these reforms have strengthened rather than weakened hierarchy as an organising 
principle of education planning.  The shift away from LEAs as providers of education 
provision suggests the displacement of certain forms of monopoly, namely the 
management of education by civil servants and their own brand of bureau-
professionalism.  Yet the growth of academies, in particular academies run by multi-
academy trusts (MATs), suggests new forms of monopoly are taking shape (Wilkins 
2017a) albeit characterised by privatisation management of public sector 
organisation or ‘exogenous privatisation’ (Ball and Youdell 2007: 14). 
 
Monopoly revisited 
 
In some cases, schools in England considered to have ‘serious weaknesses’ or 
require ‘special measures’ under section 44(2) of the Education Act 2005 are brought 
under new management by a sponsor called a MAT who runs the school as an 
academy on behalf of the government and in line with the funding agreement 
entered into by the Secretary of the State and the CEO of the MAT.  Set up as a 
private limited company, MATs are typically comprised of 2-3 academies collectively 
called collaboratives or soft federations (Salokangas and Chapman 2014).  
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Depending on the scheme of delegation, some schools within the MAT may have 
less autonomy to pursue their own forms of governance – and therefore retain their 
own separate governing body – compared to other schools.  Typically, the MAT will 
be run by a board of directors or board of trustees made up of headteachers and 
middle management who make policy decisions for all schools within the cluster.  In 
contrast to these small MATs, there exist large MATs called hard federations that 
tend to operate more prescriptive, command and control governance setups that 
compel schools to adhere to standard operational procedures in terms of teaching, 
learning and assessment (Stewart 2016).  Moreover, the board of trustees retains 
legal powers to determine the composition of any governing bodies (NCTL 2014).  A 
consequence of this rigid governance structure is that fewer schools (if any) within 
the cluster have their own governing body – and where schools do have a governing 
body (sometimes called a ‘local governing body’ or ‘academy council’) the members 
retain none of the statutory powers normally attributed to school governors.   
 
By transferring liability of the school’s assets to a MAT, the school is stripped of its 
governing body and any legal powers to employ staff, enter into contracts and plan 
budget spending.  Instead, the school is run by the board of trustees of the MAT who 
employ their own cadre of professionals to monitor and improve the quality of 
provision.  The largest of these MATs – Academies Enterprise Trust – runs 66 
primary, special and secondary schools.  The government argue that restricting 
management of large numbers of schools to a single board of trustees or a small 
number of ‘professional’ governing bodies is vital to enhancing accountability but 
also the ‘quality of governance’: 
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The growth of MATs will improve the quality of governance – meaning that the 
best governing boards will take responsibility for more schools. As fewer, 
more highly skilled boards take more strategic oversight of the trust’s schools, 
MAT boards will increasingly use professionals to hold individual school-level 
heads to account for educational standards and the professional management 
of the school (DfE 2016: 50). 
 
Here, the drive to ‘improve quality of governance’ is linked to ‘fewer, more highly 
skilled boards’, the idea being that school governance is best served by those who 
can effectively discharge their responsibilities as performance managers.  Here, the 
drive to ‘professionalise’ or ‘modernise’ school governance can be understood as a 
strategy for ‘coping with complexity’ (Jessop 2003: 3).  Complexity and variegation is 
endemic to the current system of education in England.  The rapid pace of 
decentralisation and ‘disintermediation’ (Lubienski 2014: 424) since 2010 has 
resulted in large numbers of schools operating as academy trusts and management 
groups with liability of public assets and discretionary powers to source their own 
suppliers and professional advisers as well as determine their budget spending, 
curriculum design, admissions (subject to the admissions code), staff pay and 
conditions, and length of school day and term.  Such complexity needs to be 
grasped at the level of ‘representation’ and ‘meta-analyses’ so that it is amenable to 
scrutiny from the regulators and funders of education.  Hence, increased re-
regulation (or ‘repoliticisation’) has followed the government’s plans to accelerate 
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deregulation, with direct implications for the role and composition of governing 
bodies. 
 
Academy trusts receive their funding directly from the Education and Skills Funding 
Agency (ESFA, a central government body responsible for funding and regulating 
academies) and therefore face increased regulation through tight, centralised 
accountability which aims to ensure that both government and non-government 
organisations can hold schools to account for specific purposes, agendas or 
priorities.  The conversion from LEA-maintained school to academy, therefore, 
places huge demands on the board of trustees and their governing bodies to make 
themselves auditable and workable as ‘high-reliability’ organisations capable of 
supplanting the techno-bureaucratic role of the LEA.  Academy trusts adopt 
responsibility for the kinds of financial and managerial overheads previously 
overseen by the LEA for example, namely premises management, succession 
planning, budget control, resource allocation, employment disputers, contractual 
issues, payroll and legal advice.  This includes adopting liability for all kinds of risks 
and their attendant calculations and moral hazards.  Increasingly, schools are 
harnessing the power of data and data technologies to meet these expectations, 
including the Department for Education’s school comparison tool, RAISEonline, 
Fischer Family Trust (FFT) Governor Dashboard (developed in partnership with the 
National Governors’ Association, NGA), skills audits, and bespoke self-evaluation 
tools.   
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This is not to say that the drive to modernise school governance and democratise 
school governing bodies are mutually exclusive options.  Many governing bodies in 
England, particularly those working in primary schools, are guided by a duty to be 
representative of the communities they serve and appoint and elect school 
governors on this basis (Connolly, Farrell and James 2017).  Increasingly, however, 
the meaning of ‘diversity’ underpinning the constitution of these governing bodies 
has given way to a far more corporate image, narrowly conceived in terms of skills, 
professional experience and specialist knowledge (Young 2016).  The drive to 
modernise and professionalise governance means that participatory democracy is 
not only undesirable in some cases (especially where it is linked to particular interest 
groups or is disruptive to building ‘consensus’, see Wilkins 2016) but is only 
permissible where it contributes to the smooth functioning of the school as a 
business. 
 
Crises in legitimacy 
 
The standard rhetoric of policy makers and researchers against proportional 
representation on the governing body is that too many voices (or too many 
‘unskilled’, ‘unprofessional’ voices) is potentially unwieldly and therefore 
counterproductive to achieving consensus.  In terms of decision making, consensus 
is therefore paramount to governance in as much as it gives authority to school 
governors to ratify and pursue actions deemed to be in the interest of the school and 
its pupils.  But such consensus is typically contrived.  As Rancière (2010: 196) 
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argues, consensus ‘defines a mode of symbolic structuration of the community that 
evacuates the political core constituting it, namely dissensus’. 
 
In their public criticism of traditional, democratic models of school governance (Owen 
2014), many education advisers and politicians have called for ‘professional 
governance to move beyond the current ‘amateurish’ approach to overseeing 
schools’ (Wilshaw quoted in Cross 2014) through narrowing governing body 
membership to ‘business people’ (Nash quoted in GOV.UK 2013) with the ‘right skills’ 
(Morgan quoted in GOV.UK 2015) who can achieve the ‘best or right outcome’ and 
open up the internal operation of schools to greater public scrutiny.  As more schools 
in England acquire legal powers as management groups or academy trusts to 
operate outside their LEA as academies (sometimes called ‘state-funded 
independent schools’), the government have called for greater epistocracy (rule by 
the most knowledgeable) and in some cases monopoly (rule by hierarchy) in the way 
that schools are governed. 
 
These reforms include restricting governance to those with ‘significantly better 
epistemic capabilities – relevant knowledge and skills – than others’ (Holst and 
Molander 2014: 13).  At the same time, it means limiting governance participation to 
the control of a single authority or body of professionals, usually realised through the 
involvement of new actors and organisations from business and philanthropy 
(Wilkins 2017a).  The result is that ordinary citizens and local communities find 
themselves increasingly marginalised from the business of governance and its 
expert administration.  Moreover, these reforms serve an important discursive-
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political strategy, namely to polarise meanings and practices of governance and 
democracy as mutually incompatible.  Speaking at a conference in 2014 organised 
by the British Educational Leadership, Management and Administration Society 
(BELMAS) and the National Governors’ Association (NGA), former Conservative 
chair of the education select committee, Graham Stuart, said he was ‘less interested 
in democratic accountability than in quality’ (Stuart 2014). 
 
In this context, the function of governance is to improve the transparency and 
efficiency of the internal operation of schools for the purpose of making them publicly 
accountable and auditable or sustainable as businesses: ‘Running a school is in 
many ways like running a business, so we need more business people coming 
forward to become governors’ (Nash quoted in GOV.UK 2013).  Consensus is 
therefore vital to governance in as much as it advances the smooth functioning of the 
school as a ‘high-reliability’ organisation (Reynolds 2010: 18).  Consensus is 
conducive to the division and differentiation of work, the sequestering and delegation 
of roles and responsibilities, and the standardisation of judgements as auditable or 
‘actionable’ within a framework of rational account giving (Wilkins 2016). 
 
The strong demand for consensus on governing bodies increases participation 
inequality, however.  It is far more likely, for example, that those who can contribute 
to the smooth functioning of the governing body (‘people like us’) will be favoured 
over people who do not share similar priorities, knowledge or preferences.  One of 
the ways in which governing bodies aim to secure compliance in this regard is by 
disciplining school governors to divest themselves of any vested interests or 
18 
 
prejudices that detract from the purpose of governance.  This explains why parent 
governors are sometimes singled out as ‘problematic’ or ‘difficult’ (Wilkins 2016).   
 
Unlike other members of the governing body who are co-opted to their position by 
the chair and vice-chair, usually on the basis on an interview and skills audit or 
competency framework, parent governors are elected by the parent body of the 
school and therefore enter in to their position by virtue of the will of the local 
community.  In most cases, parent governors are sufficiently ‘enculturated’ through 
orientations and repeated, compulsory training to ensure they understand the 
parameters of their role and responsibility.  But since parents are elected rather than 
co-opted to the governing body, they represent a potentially subversive element that 
threatens to destabilise governance unless properly orientated and audited.  As 
stated in the School Governance Regulations (DfE 2013a: 2), ‘The governing body 
may only appoint as a parent governor [or partnership governor] a person who has, 
in the opinion of the governing body, the skills required to contribute to the effective 
governance and success of the school’.   
 
Governance, on this account, is a heavily politicised, controlled environment. In 2016 
the government issued plans to remove the requirement for governing bodies to 
retain democratically elected members, namely parent governors (DfE 2016).  While 
the requirement was later scrapped, the proposal to alleviate representative 
democracy as a function of governance is indicative of a government that is anxious 
about the capacity of some governors to effectively monitor the financial and 
educational performance of multi-million pound organisations.  Hence the 
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government emphasises the importance of risk-based regulation to governance and 
continuously intervenes by way of funding agreements, performance benchmarking 
and attrition through inspection and high-stakes testing to exercise greater control 
over the limits and possibilities of governance (Wilkins 2017b).  Moreover, the 
government have expressed a strong preference for MATs who ‘increasingly use 
professionals to hold individual school-level heads to account for educational 
standards and the professional management of the school’ (DfE 2016: 50).   
 
The government also appear to favour MATs to the extent they are depoliticised 
entities with largely techno-managerialist ambitions that include enhancing vertical 
accountability.  In 2017, however, the House of Commons Education Committee 
(HCEC) report on MATs concluded that ‘There is too much emphasis on ‘upward’ 
accountability and not enough on local engagement’ (HCEC 2017).  According to 
Glatter (2013), these trends are evidence of a ‘crisis of legitimacy’ in as much as 
governance legitimacy is not judged against evidence of civic participation and 
democratic control but rather depends on the extent to which schools are ancillaries 
to government rule and corporate and contract measures of accountability. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has explored the growing influence of technocratic cultures on 
education structures and processes, and the diminishing role of participatory 
democracy in these contexts.  Specifically, the chapter details the rise of epistocracy 
and monopoly and its implications for democratic governance in schools.  Through 
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tracing the history of school governance and its development in relation to changes 
in education law and policy, especially the introduction of the Academies Act 2010, 
this chapter analyses the prevalence of a set of social arrangements, institutional 
orders and dominant discourses that appear to sustain as well as legitimate certain 
anti-democratic principles and practices.  ‘Governance failure’ (Jessop 2000) is a 
recurring problem in education systems where significant instructional, financial and 
operational powers are devolved to schools and their communities, and this might 
partly explain why the government and many non-government organisations and 
actors, from governance consultants and support services to governors themselves, 
appear to favour elements of epistocracy and monopoly in the education system.  
Here, governance failure can be measured against the capacity of school governors 
to discharge their responsibilities as custodians of public interest.   
 
Although not democratic in design or practice, epistocracy (rule by the most 
knowledgeable) and monopoly (rule by hierarchy) appears to mitigate some of the 
worst features of governance failure to the extent it insulates governance from 
aspects of inefficiency or ineffectiveness, be it ‘unwieldly’ discourse that favours 
dissensus over consensus or priorities and preferences that resist or evade capture 
from the ‘lure of the explicit’ (Green 2011: 49).  Instead, the government are keen to 
limit governance participation and action to 1) Professional guidelines and 
judgements that are amenable to external scrutiny; 2) Consensus building that is 
apolitical and driven by knowledge specialists, experts and research people; 3) 
Dialogue that is ‘actionable’ according to the explicitness and transparency of 
economic indicators, compliance orders and accountability targets; and 4) 
Technocratic precision shaped by efficient instruments of problem solving, 
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performance evaluation and risk regulation.  Not only is democracy trivialised in 
these contexts as beyond the remit of governance; it is typically regarded as 
dangerous or risky in as much as it threatens to undercut the smooth functioning of 
the above procedures and directives.  
 
In their discussion of ‘mini-publics’, Escobar and Elstub (2017) outline a number of 
democratically innovative approaches to strengthening citizen participation in matters 
of public interest, from science and technology to health and education.  These 
innovations in participatory governance include citizens’ juries, consensus 
conferences and deliberative polls.  The purpose of these experiments in 
participatory governance is to gain a better understanding of how the public might 
deal with matters of public interest if they had the time and resources to do so.  
Rather than aggregate citizen knowledge and opinion through a voting system, for 
example, participatory governance (or participatory democracy) is designed to 
empower citizens through learning, support and deliberation to engage in complex 
issues about making good collective decisions.  In the case of school governance in 
England, there are strong elements of representative democracy that impact the 
composition and decision making of governing bodies, at least among those schools 
that still have a governing body.  Parent governors are a staple among many 
governing bodies, for example.  Yet deliberation on these governing bodies tend to 
be subject to specialised standards of technocratic evaluations and bounded 
judgements determined by external authorities rather than genuine citizen 
deliberation.  The formation of mini-publics in schools are not only necessary to 
improve equality in governance participation and extend governance to genuine 
22 
 
public deliberation, but are vital to redressing the crisis of legitimacy within public 
education and its democratic deficit. 
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